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Abstract  
This article strives to move forward toward an embodied account of cognitive semantics. Using 
current empirical embodiment findings and theoretical interpretations thereof, the major 
schematic systems of Talmyan cognitive semantics (configurational structure, attention, 
perspective, and force dynamics) are all presented within one unified embodied account. It will 
be shown that there is much empirical evidence that thought is spatialized and that our eyes 
project this spatialized thought into the external (usually near) space in front of our body. This—
eyes projecting spatialized thought into peripersonal space—will be called the theory of ocular 
cognitive semantics (and will sometimes also more generally be referred to as the theory of the 
ocular mind). Ocular cognitive semantics is meant to be a first step forward toward a more 
comprehensive theory of embodied cognitive semantics. Clinical implications of ocular 
cognitive semantics for people with schizophrenia are discussed.  
Keywords: cognitive semantics, eye movements, mental time line, attention, field perspective, 
observer perspective, force dynamics, schizophrenia  
 
1 Introduction  
Talmy calls his vast body of work on the nature of human cognition and language “cognitive 
semantics” and characterizes its basics in the following way:  
. . . the word “semantic” simply refers to the specifically linguistic form of the more generic notion “conceptual.” 
Thus, general conception—that is, thought—includes linguistic meaning within its greater compass. . . research on 
cognitive semantics is research on conceptual content and its organization in language and, hence, on the nature of 
conceptual content in general. In this formulation, conceptual content is understood to encompass not just ideational 
content but any experiential content, including affect and perception (Talmy, 2000a, p. 4).  
Thus, cognitive-semantic research is understood to include studying thought per se. This 
naturally brings a general psychological component to this line of research. Indeed, one of the 
main concerns of the cognitive-semantic approach—as well as of the cognitive-linguistic 
approach in general—has always been “to integrate the linguistic and the psychological 
perspectives on cognitive organization in a unified understanding of human conceptual 
structure” (Talmy, 2000a, p. 3). In this article I provide an account of such “a unified 
understanding of human conceptual structure” by showing that cognitive research is at a stage 
now that allows us to view cognitive semantics systematically through an embodied perspective. 
The definition of embodiment which I offer is that thought and emotion can be considered as 
embodied, when their cognitive processing is strongly and systematically influenced by the 
sensory and motor system. I think that this characterization of embodiment (sometimes without 
spelling it out explicitly) underlies much classic and current experimental work in the 
embodiment realm (e.g., Bergen & Wheeler, 2009; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Hartmann, 
Martarelli, Mast, & Stocker, 2014; Huette, Winter, Matlock, & Spivey, 2014 ). Such a 
characterization of embodiment is also in line with one view on embodied cognition that has 
been described by Talmy (2011, 636–637), the view that “we do much of our thinking and 
reasoning in terms of. . . experientially derived structures” (p. 637). However, Talmy also puts a 
note of caution to this view, saying that if this view is applied too broadly, it “might obscure the 
possible existence of an actual cognitive system for objectivity and reason” (p. 637). Such a 
system might exist in a sui generis manner and might not be derived from sensory or motor 
experiences. I concur with this note of caution. In this context, I would like to stress that there is 
no principled reason which would allow us to assume the following: that the proposal that a 
thought is structured by the sensory and motor system and that the proposal that faculty of 
reasoning might also exist in a sui generis manner are contradictory. For instance, Knauff (2013) 
presents a large body of empirical evidence which shows convincingly that spatial 
representations—which he calls spatial layout models—might greatly facilitate logical 
reasoning. However, while these spatial layouts (which might well represent experientially 
derived structures) seem to greatly assist us in carrying out logical reasoning, the reason why 
logical reasoning exists in the first place can still not be merely explained by the existence of 
these spatial layouts (an observation which also seems to be in line with Knauff’s views). Thus, 
when I in this article speak of “embodied cognitive semantics” I propose that cognitive-semantic 
concepts involve structures and processes of the sensory and motor systems—but at the same 
time, this does not preclude the possibility that cognitive systems other than the sensory and 
motor systems also contribute to the construction of thought—for instance thought systems such 
as logical reasoning.  
My basic proposal in relation to embodied cognitive semantics is this: it is time to consider the 
possibility that much, if not all, of the cognitive processing that has been described in theory of 
cognitive semantics ((Talmy, 2000a,b, 2005, 2007a, 2011, 2015) is also systematically reflected 
in the physical eye. This proposal will lead to the theory of ocular cognitive semantics. As 
cognitive semantics is essentially a theory about the mind (Ibarretxe Antuñano, 2006, p. 253), I 
will sometimes also refer to the theory of ocular cognitive semantics simply as the theory of the 
“ocular mind.” Thus these terms will be used interchangeably, depending on whether the focus 
is on cognitive-semantic theory or on the mind in general. Ocular cognitive semantics forms, as 
I hope to demonstrate, a substantial basic part of an embodied account of cognitive semantics. 
To provide an immediate first sense of how ocular phenomena can be theorized to relate to 
cognitive semantics, consider (1). (1) offers one major ocular (oculomotor or pupillometric) 
prediction in relation to the four major schematic systems of cognitive semantics (Talmy, 
2000a): configurational structure, attention, perspective, and force dynamics. All of these 
predictions and the related empirical findings will be examined and discussed in the relevant 
sections.  
(1) Ocular (oculomotor and pupillometric) predictions for major cognitive semantic schematic 
systems  
a. Oculomotorically reflected configurational structure (related to the domain member notions 
“space” and “time”): Our eyes look at or along invisible geometric paths (parts of 
configurational structure) that are mentally projected into the peripersonal space in front of our 
body. For instance: our eyes look along an invisible mental time line in peripersonal space 
while mentally processing time (Section 2).  
b. Oculomotorically reflected attention: Our eyes look more at foregrounded mental structure 
than at backgrounded mental structure in peripersonal space. For instance: our eyes look more 
at the temporal Figure point than at the temporal Ground point on the on the mental time line 
in peripersonal space (Section 4).  
c. Oculomotorically reflected perspective: Our eyes look at mental structure in peripersonal 
space in a particular perspective. For instance: our eyes look upward to a future point on the 
mental time line in peripersonal space, or, as a possible perspectival alternative, our eyes look 
upward and rightward to a future point on the mental time line in peripersonal space 
(Section 3).  
d. Pupillometrically reflected force dynamics: Our pupils might dilate more when cognitively 
processing more complex force-dynamic structure than when cognitively processing less 
complex force-dynamic structure. Additionally, force-dynamic structure can also be proposed 
to unfold along the mental time line in peripersonal space, for instance in relation to two 
specific points on the time line, one representing the cause and one representing the effect 
(Sections 7 and 8.2).  
As I will show in this article, there is much empirical evidence that thought is spatialized and 
that our eyes project this spatialized thought into the external (usually near) space in front of our 
body. In the relevant experiments that will be discussed to support the theory of the ocular mind 
(ocularized cognitive semantics), this external space is often an empty (eye-tracked) screen. In 
more natural contexts, the external space might often be the peripersonal empty space right in 
front of us, roughly the same space that we sometimes also use for co-speech gestures. Thus, if 
one were to gesture, while, for example, verbally describing lower floors of a tall building, 
followed by a description of higher floors (without seeing the building), it would be natural to 
use gestures that would depict the upward progression of the description. However, such mental 
representations (of for example looking more and more upward along a tall building) are also 
“acted out” by corresponding upward eye movements, even when people are only imagining or 
recalling such scenes (cognitive activities which are not typically accompanied by manual 
gestures) (Spivey & Geng, 2001). Likewise, the construction of a mental time line (for example, 
with the past to the left and the future to the right) cannot only be acted out by corresponding 
gestures while speaking (Casasanto & Jasmin, 2012; Cooperrider & Núñez, 2009), but can also 
be acted out by corresponding eye movements—for instance even when we only listen to 
(Stocker, Hartmann, Martarelli, & Mast, in revision ) or imagine (Hartmann, Martarelli, Mast, & 
Stocker, 2014) time-related concepts, instances where we typically do not manually gesture 
either. Perhaps then one way of thinking of the theory of the ocular mind is to say that “we 
gesture even if we don’t gesture by hand”—because our eye movements “gesture” or “act out” 
these mental concepts into the external space in front of us, even in the absence of manual 
gestures. A kind of “gestural gaze” is projected by our eyes into the peripersonal space, and it is 
this gestural gaze that allows one to systematically bring in an embodied ocular dimension into 
cognitive semantics. That gaze can play a cognitively meaningful role has long been noticed in 
studies of social interaction, where specific uses of gaze for instance play a role in turn taking 
(Kendon, 1967; McNeill, 2006).  
Based on decades of research, Talmy has characterized cognitive semantics as involving several 
cognitive schematic systems, the main ones being configurational structure, perspective, 
attention, and force dynamics (Talmy, 1988b, 2000a). While Talmy has laid out each of these 
schematic systems quite extensively, an account that synthesizes these different schematic 
systems into one larger unified whole has, to the best of my knowledge, not been provided yet. 
Hence, it has for instance not been laid out yet, how the Talmyan schematic system force 
dynamics (causal and causality-related thought) relates to the Talmyan schematic system 
configurational structure (which is mainly concerned with spatial and temporal thought). 
However, Talmy does provide a first basic sketch (a sketch which he does not follow up any 
further) how force-dynamic mental structure might manifest in spatiotemporal mental structure:  
. . .force dynamics is a fourth schematic system: to the preceding basically pictorial complex [such as a mental 
image, which can be described with the configurational- structure, perspective, and the attention systems], one now 
adds the forces that the elements of the structural framework exert on each other (2000a, p. 467).  
Given the theoretical components of the ocular mind theory—the cognitive components that I 
will use to describe configurational structure, attention, and perspective in Sections 2 to 7—
Talmy’s idea to “add the forces that the elements of the structural framework exert on each 
other” to the basically “pictorial complex” turns out to lead to rather complex mental 
representations. It will lead, as we will see, to a complex conglomerate of cognitive spacetime, 
perspective, and force dynamics. To introduce the new theory of the ocular mind in this article, I 
will mainly analyze and discuss the cognitive-semantic structure underlying the following 
sentence (from Stocker, 2014b, p. 129):  
(2) Mary went to bed because she was tired.  
This perhaps seemingly simple statement is of rich mental complexity and involves all of the 
main schematic categories that Talmy proposes for cognitive semantics: it involves 
configurational structure, attention, perspective (in both “space” and “time”), and force 
dynamics. In this article, I will examine the embodied (largely ocular) aspect of these cognitive-
semantic schematic systems, exemplifying it with (2). One helpful start for teasing out the rich 
conceptual complexity of a seemingly simple statement like (2) is to consider the whole set of 
open-class and closed-class elements that such a sentence contains (cf. Talmy, 2000a, pp. 33–
34)—with the open-class specifications remaining a heuristic approximation. The open-class 
elements of (2) and what they specify are listed in (3):  
(3) Open-class elements of Mary went to bed because she was tired1 
A. Mary: occurring in “space,” person, female, proper name, specified individual 
                                                        1 In some cases in (3) and (4) where “occurring in space” will be stated, the reader might 
wonder if rather not “occurring in time” should be stated—and vice versa. As an attempt to 
resolve these ambiguities, the concept of object spacetime for “space” and the concept of event 
spacetime for “time” (Stocker, 2014c) will be introduced in Section 2.   
(individuation), uniplex2  
B. go: occurring in “space,” biped motion (for one possibility)  C . bed: occurr    
flat piece of furniture intended for sleeping (for one possibility)  
D. tired: occurring in “space,” a physiological condition in which a considerable part of one’s 
bodily or mental resources have been consumed  
The cognitive-semantic schematic systems (the main concern of the present article) are mainly 
reflected in qualitative properties that the closed-class system of a language specifies (Talmy, 
2000a, p. 40). Thus, the present article will focus on the schematic structuring that is revealed in 
(4), which lists the closed-class elements of (2) and what they specify. The cognitive semantic 
schematic systems (SYS) or schematic categories (CAT), to which the listed elements belong, 
are put in brackets.  
(4) Closed-class elements of Mary went to bed because she was tired  
A. First use of past tense (for “go”)  
1. occurring in “time” (SYS: configurational structure; CAT: domain)   
2. an event (temporal Figure) occurs before the present moment (temporal Ground)  
(SYS: attention; CAT: Figure and Ground)3   
3. temporal Figure and Ground can be schematized to points (no extension) on a mental  
time line (SYS: configurational structure; CAT: degree of extension)   
B. Second use of past tense (past tense of “be” follows past tense of “go”)                                                          2 Plexity is a term from Talmy (2000a, pp. 48–50). It stands for the concepts of uniplexity and multiplexity, which, respectively, stand for “conceptual singularity” and “conceptual plurality” across both “space” and “time.” Thus bird as well as sighed (once) can both be regarded as uniplex, and birds and kept sighing both as multiplex. Also certain forms that are grammatically speaking singular—e.g., furniture—are conceptually considered to be multiplex.   3 Considered in its entirety, the cognitive-semantic system attention (Talmy, 2007a) is a huge cognitive system involved in assigning different degrees of salience to (often linguistically induced) cognitive representations. It can be broken up into some ten categories, most with subcategories, which contain over fifty to date identified basic attention mechanisms. Out of this huge range of cognitive attention mechanisms, for this article I chose to mainly focus on just two: the foundational notions of Figure and Ground. This choice was motivated because clear oculomotor (empirically confirmed) predictions can be made for temporal Figure and Ground on the mental time line (see Section 3). Thus, this is one first example of how attention phenomena are reflected in the physical eye.   
1. occurring in “time” (SYS: configurational structure; CAT: domain)   
2. two events (temporal Composite Figure) occur before the present moment (temporal 
Ground of Composite Figure) (SYS: attention; CAT: Figure and Ground)  
3. temporal Composite Figure and Ground of Composite Figure can be schematized to 
points (no extension) on a mental time line (SYS: configurational structure; CAT: degree of 
extension)  
C. to   
1. occurring in “space” (as one possibility) (SYS: configurational structure; CAT: domain)  
2. motion toward an object (as one possibility) (SYS: configurational structure; CAT: path)  
D. becausetemporal   
1. occurring in “time” (SYS: configurational structure; CAT: domain)  
2. one event (cause) occurs before another event (effect) (for one temporal possibility of 
cause and effect occurrence) (SYS: attention; CAT: Figure and Ground)  
E. becausespatial/causal  
1. occurring in “space” (SYS: configurational structure; CAT: domain) (in “space” since 
because assigns force-dynamic structure onto “objects” (including animate “objects”) in 
“space”; cf. Section 2)  
2. one entity (force-dynamic antagonist placed in the subordinate clause) imposes its force 
upon another entity (force-dynamic agonist placed in the main clause) (SYS: force dynamics)  
F. shespatial   
1. occurring in “space” (SYS: configurational structure; CAT: domain)   
2. reference to an animate entity that possesses gender, as one possibility: person  
a. uniplex (SYS: configurational structure; CAT: plexity)  
b. female (SYS: configurational structure; CAT: gender)  
c. other (as opposed to self): the speaker indicates that he/she is not the person referred to 
in the sentence (SYS: perspective; CAT: third person)  
G. shetemporal  
1. occurring in “time” (discourse time) (SYS: configurational structure; CAT: domain) (in 
“time” because the anaphoric dimension of she refers to an “event”—a “speech event” in 
this case; cf. next point as well as Section 2)  
2. person last mentioned (reference back to the speech event, written event, etc. in which the 
person was last mentioned; anaphoric reference) (SYS: perspective; CAT: event)  
In this way, in relation to (2) I will first examine: embodied domain (a most basic part of 
configurational structure) (Section 2), then add perspective in “time” to it (Section 3), then 
embodied attention (Section 4), to then further add embodied perspective in “space” (Section 5) 
as well as embodied plexity, gender, and path (further aspects of “spatial” configurational 
structure) (Section 6)—to then finally also “add the forces that the elements of the structural 
framework exert on each other” (Talmy, cf. above) (Section 7). Please note that (2) just serves 
exemplifying purposes. The proposal of the ocular mind (of ocular cognitive semantics) that can 
be developed in this manner can then be applied quite generally to thought.  
Perhaps a note should be inserted here why “time” (Section 3) is addressed before “space” 
(Section 5). “Space” is still widely treated as more basic than “time” (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 
1999; Núñez & Sweetser, 2006). However, other work—which we cannot examine in detail 
here—has in my view convincingly made a case that both “space” and “time” are equally basic 
(Evans, 2013; Galton, 2010; Stocker, 2014c; Talmy, 2011, pp. 636–637). Evans and Galton for 
instance argue convincingly that the concept of “transience” basically involves time; Talmy 
provides comparable arguments for temporal notions like “starting,” “continuing”, “stopping,” 
“waiting,” and others; and Stocker undertakes a detailed literature review (combined with 
cognitive-linguistic analysis) and concludes that there is “sui generis space” as well as “sui 
generis time” within human cognition. Thus, by first examining “time” (Section 3) and then 
“space” (Section 5), I do not want to imply that “time” is more basic than “space”. Following 
the arguments of Stocker (2014c), I assume that both “space” and “time” exist in their own 
right. This, as also detailed in Stocker (2014c), does not exclude the additional possibility that 
“space” can be metaphorically mapped onto “time.” The reason why I examine “time” before 
“space” in relation to (2), is that (2) in essence is a cause-and-effect structure, where the cause 
takes place first, and the effect second (called successful causation with consecutive cause and 
effect in Stocker (2014b)). Given this overall temporal structure, I find it more natural to 
examine “time” before “space” in this particular case.  
 
2 Embodied domain  
This section lays out the basic geometric pathways along which our eyes project mental content 
into the peripersonal space in front of us while we think about concepts that involve space and 
time. This allows us to lay out the geometric scaffoldings of the ocular mind. In Talmyan 
cognitive semantics, the notions of “space” and “time” relate to the foundational schematic 
category domain (which is part of the schematic system configurational structure).  
The schematic category of domain has two principal member notions, ‘space’ and ‘time’. . . the kind of quantity 
existing in space is, generically, ‘matter’, and, in respectively continuous   or discrete form, is ‘mass’ and ‘objects’. 
The kind of quantity existing in time, is, generically, ‘action’ and, in continuous or discrete form, is ‘activity’ and 
‘acts’—terms here used neutrally as to whether the action is static or changing, autonomous or agentive (Talmy, 
2000a, p. 42).  
This space-time dichotomy, as for instance reflected in this quote of Talmy, is commonly found 
in psychology and cognitive science (Stocker, 2014c). However, in Stocker (2014c) I argued 
that we are now at a stage in cognitive science that allows us to go beyond the space-time 
dichotomy. Based on extensive linguistic analysis and experimental review, I developed two 
main proposals in that article. The first is that what is commonly referred to as “space” (or 
“spatial cognition”) in the cognitive sciences always contains time. The second is that what is 
commonly referred to as “time” (or “temporal cognition”) always contains space. Thus, I 
introduced the term object spacetime (or object-spatiotemporal cognition) for “space” (or 
“spatial cognition”), as well the term event spacetime (event-spatiotemporal cognition) for 
“time” (or “temporal cognition”). I also developed the terms in the same generic sense as in 
Talmy’s quote above, keeping object and event spacetime for instance continuous/discrete-
neutral. Thus, I used the term “object” in a most generic sense. In cognitive spacetime, the 
conceptualized quantity in object spacetime is considered an “object”, no matter if it is animate 
or inanimate, concrete or abstract, continuous or discrete. Likewise, the conceptualized quantity 
in event spacetime is considered an “event”, no matter if it is continuous or discrete. Relating 
this analytic spacetime framework back to (4), everything that relates to an object in this generic 
sense is classified as “occurring in space” and everything that relates to an event in this generic 
sense is classified as “occurring in time”—which now translates into “occurring in object 
spacetime” and “occurring in event spacetime,” respectively. In Stocker (2014c) I also tried to 
provide evidence that both object spacetime and event spacetime also consist of “sui generis 
space” and “sui generis time” (cf. 1)—with the additional possibility that event spacetime can 
also take on (at least in most languages/cultures) “space” that has been mapped from object 
spacetime.  
For object spacetime, one of the main points that suggested proposing the existence of this 
subdomain was the argument that even static cognitive space—Talmy’s stasis (2000b, p. 237)— 
involves conceptualizing time. The proposal that even static space contains time was developed 
by using a specific cognitive-semantic method called “analytic manipulation” by Talmy 
(2007b). Such analysis gave evidence that even a static sentence like There are some houses in 
the valley contains time (see pp. 75–76 in Stocker, 2014c). For event spacetime, there were two 
main points which suggested proposing the existence of this subdomain. The first such 
observation was that temporal expressions which only etymologically relate to mapped space, 
expressions like before and after, can cognitive-linguistically be argued to contain specific 
spatial structure in their contemporary use— spatial structure that differs from their spatial 
structure in earlier days, when they still functioned as metaphors (Stocker, 2012a, 2014c). The 
second such observation is that the users of a language which seems largely to lack spatial 
metaphors for time (which seems a rare occurrence), nevertheless seem to mentally construe a 
spatial time line (as observed in Amondawa by Sinha, Sinha, Zinken, & Sampaio, 2011).  
Given their spatial component, both object and event spacetime consist of a certain mental 
geometry. Object spacetime consists of three-dimensional cognitive space xyz with time t 
unfolding along the fourth dimension as an abstract nonspatial correlate within the xyz-space 
(Stocker, 2014c; Fig. 1a). Take the example:  
(5) One ball followed another down the spiral staircase.  
Conceptualizing the mental scene underlying this sentence involves a mental representation 
where the balls move through the xyz-space of object spacetime (a spiral path in this case) and at 
the same time progress along fourth-dimensional t. Event spacetime consists (in most 
cultures/languages) of one-dimensional space x with time t unfolding as a correlate along the x-
path (Fig. 1b). The x-axis of event spacetime corresponds to what is often referred to as the 
mental time line in psychology and cognitive science (e.g., Arzy, Adi-Japha, & Blanke, 2009; 
Hartmann & Mast, 2012; Hartmann, Martarelli, Mast, & Stocker, 2014; Ulrich & Maienborn, 
2010). Take the example (from Stocker, 2012a, p. 396):  
(6) New Year’s follows Christmas.  
As examined in Stocker (2012a), conceptualizing the scene underlying this sentence, involves a 
mental representation where the events New Year’s and Christmas are mentally construed as 
moving along the mental time line—or along xt-spacetime in the spatiotemporal terminology of 
Stocker (2014c). (The terms xt-spacetime and mental time line will be used interchangeably in 
this article). The mental time line will be further investigated in Section 3.  
Fig. 1 illustrates and summarizes the proposed revision of the cognitive-semantic schematic 
category domain by laying out its basic geometric properties.  
 
Figure 1: The cognitive-semantic schematic category domain (foundational part of the 
schematic system configurational structure) with its two principal member notions “space” and 
“time” (Talmy, 2000a: 42–47) has been, following Stocker (2014c), revised to in the current 
section to propose the domain cognitive spacetime with its two principal member notions 
(subdomains) a) object spacetime and b) event spacetime (Fig. from Stocker, 2014c, used with 
permission). These spatiotemporal structures function as geometric scaffoldings which are 
projected into the peripersonal space (in front of our body) by our gestural gaze.  
In this section, we have developed the two principal member notions “space” and “time” of 
Talmy’s cognitive-semantic schematic category domain (part of the system configurational 
structure) (Talmy, 2000a, pp. 42–47) into the new domain of cognitive spacetime with its two 
new principal member notions (subdomains) object spacetime and event spacetime (Stocker, 
2014c). As has been discussed, the concept of cognitive spacetime can account for the 
observation that there is always “time” in what is commonly referred to as “space” in cognitive 
science and psychology, and there is always “space” in what is commonly referred to as “time” 
in cognitive science and psychology. Thus, all the cognitive-semantic elements that have been 
referred to as “occurring in space” in (3) and (4) can be more adequately thought of as 
“occurring in object spacetime,” and all the cognitive-semantic elements that have been referred 
to as “occurring in time” can be more adequately thought of as “occurring in event spacetime.” 
Note that the domain of spacetime is so basic that not a single element in (3) and (4) is not either 
part of object spacetime or event spacetime. As we will see, in the theory of ocular cognitive 
semantics, such spatiotemporal properties are projected out by our gestural gaze into the 
peripersonal space in front of our body.  
 
3 Embodied perspective and configurational structure in “time”  
Having laid out the basic geometric properties of the configurational-structural schematic 
category domain in the previous section, we are now in a position to systematically move 
toward an embodied cognitive semantics. In this section, we turn to the question how the 
Talmyan schematic system perspective can be integrated into this embodied account. This is 
how Talmy introduces perspective:  
The present schematic system consists of the perspective that one can have on [a referent] entity...this system thus 
establishes a conceptual perspective point [PP] from which the entity is cognitively regarded. While this schematic 
system is presumably neutral to particular sensory modalities, it is most readily characterized in visual terms as, in 
effect, pertaining to where one places one’s “mental eyes” to “look out” upon a referent structure (2000a, p. 68).  
Talmy has also shown that there can be a cognitive-semantic perspective point (PP) in both 
“space” and “time” (Talmy, 2000a), which corresponds to object spacetime and event spacetime 
in the framework of this paper (Section 2). In this section, I will show that Talmy’s “mental 
eyes” actually “look out” via the physical eye, mostly into the peripersonal space right in front 
of us. In event spacetime, the physical eye looks upon the mental time line that we find in the 
(often peripersonal) space in front of our body.  
As mentioned in the introduction, we will mainly use sentence (2)—Mary went to bed because 
she was tired—for exemplification purposes because this sentence involves (as so many 
sentences do) all the main schematic categories that Talmy proposes for cognitive semantics 
(Talmy, 2000a): configurational structure, attention, perspective (in both object spacetime and 
event spacetime), and force dynamics. Note that (2) clearly—albeit implicitly—contains 
temporal information: it suggests that Mary is first tired and then goes to bed. Stocker (2014b) 
analyzes this as a consecutive occurrence of cause and effect, as opposed to a simultaneous 
occurrence of cause and effect, which is the other possible temporal arrangement of cause and 
effect (cf. also Talmy 1988a, 2000a). As for (2), Mary will of course still be tired once she is in 
bed (at least before falling asleep), but the crucial aspect in relation to consecutive cause and 
effect is that the ‘going to bed’ only takes place as a subsequent event in relation to the onset of 
Mary’s tiredness. (2) is a typical cause-effect conceptualization (called successful causation or 
s-causation in Stocker, 2014b): a cause prompts an effect, Mary’s tiredness prompts her to go to 
bed.  
We will assume that the speaker of sentence (2) relates an episodic (personal) memory: the 
speaker has actually seen Mary being tired and then going to bed. In terms of embodiment, it is 
important to become this specific about the temporal information—an issue that I am going to 
elaborate upon now before then returning to analyzing (2). There are three recent eye-tracking 
studies that for the (to the best of my knowledge) first time have shown that our eyes 
unconsciously look along a mentally construed time line while we cognitively process time. The 
first “ocular time line” finding relates to episodic memory and future thinking: our eyes look 
along a diagonal mental time line (left/down: past; right/up: future) while recalling an episodic 
memory image or imagining an episodic future image (Hartmann, Martarelli, Mast, & Stocker, 
2014). In this study of Hartmann and colleagues, participants where instructed to recall an 
episodic memory image or imagine an episodic future image for one minute (while looking at an 
empty screen in the critical condition). The left/down effect for the past and the right/up effect 
for the future was strongest after about 30–40 seconds—which is the time span that we know 
from another study that participants often need until they have a clear mental image in mind, 
when asked to generate one (D’Argembeau & and Van der Linden 2004). The second “ocular 
time line” finding relates to serial recall: our eyes look along a left-to-right mental time line 
during recall tasks. When recalling (by speaking them out) serial items (five random digits), 
then the eyes look furthest to the left for the item that has been presented/encoded first—and the 
more recently the items have been presented/encoded, the more the eyes look to the right 
(Rinaldi, Brugger, Bockisch, Bertolini, & Girelli, 2015). The third “ocular time line” finding 
relates to online auditory processing of temporal-relation words like before-that (German: 
vorher) and after-that (German: nachher). While listening to such words, the eyes look less 
upward when auditorily processing a before-that (past) relation, and more upward when 
processing an after-that (future) relation (within a time window of about 3500 milliseconds after 
the acoustic onset of the word) (Stocker, Hartmann, Martarelli, & Mast, in revision). In this 
identified ocular time line, time is probably not only flowing upward but also forward at the 
same time (see Stocker et al., in revision for detailed argumentation). Taken together, these 
findings establish a first firm empirical basis that our eyes look along a mental time line while 
processing time, regardless of what kind of cognitive processing is involved (be it episodic 
memory/future thinking, working- memory serial recall, or online processing of temporal 
words). The possible functional status (as opposed to a merely epiphenomenal status) of eyes 
looking at or along a time line is discussed in Section 8.2.  
Using the just discussed empirical findings (Hartmann et al., 2014; Rinaldi et al., 2015; Stocker 
et al., in revision) as a basis, I propose that the temporal-episodic information in relation to (2) is 
projected along a time line in peripersonal space in front of our body. As episodic processing 
suggests a left/down-to-up/right time line (Hartmann et al., 2014), I will provisionally assume 
that such a time line is involved when a speaker is processing a memory by uttering a statement 
like (2). As direct research on possibly existing time lines while verbally recollecting episodic 
memories is missing (we only have data for imagining episodic memories), it could also turn out 
that we conceptualize another time line during such a cognitive activity—for example, only left 
to right or no time line at all. However, given the current state of research (as just presented) I 
find it more likely that a mental time line is also mentally construed during verbally recalling 
episodic memories. Thus, such an assumption is built into Fig. 3. Whether this assumption really 
holds true, only future research can tell.  
Stocker (2012a) provides a detailed analysis to demonstrate that the use of the past tense 
suggests that the past tense schematizes events on the time line as geometric points. As (2) also 
involves the past tense, the involved events can also be schematized as points on the spatialized 
time line in peripersonal space. In terms of cognitive semantics, the events belong to the 
principal member notion point of the schematic category degree of extension. This schematic 
category has three principal member notions (point, bounded extent, and unbounded extent) and 
belongs to the schematic system configurational structure (Talmy, 2000a, pp. 61–62).  
We may also note that (2) involves chronological-order-reversed or antisequential processing of 
temporal information (Talmy, 2000a): the effect (Mary went to bed), which temporally takes 
place after the cause (she was tired), is linguistically evoked first (by being first mentioned). 
Cognitively processing the past tense within Mary went to bed is proposed to trigger off an eye 
gaze (G1) that places event B (the effect) leftward/downward on the episodic mental time line in 
the peripersonal space in front of our body. Still cognitively processing the temporal aspect of 
because in because she was tired is proposed to then trigger off a second ocular gaze (G2) that 
places event A (the cause) still more leftward/downward than event B on the episodic mental 
time line in the peripersonal space in front of our body.  
 
Figure 2: Cognitive-semantic perspective in “time” is developed into an ocular mental-time-line 
perspective in peripersonal space, using the temporal-ocular findings of Stocker and colleagues 
(in review) and Hartmann and colleagues (2014) as an empirical basis. Here, the episodic time 
line (past: left/down; future: right/up) is illustrated. Our eyes look along a diagonal mental time 
line (left/down: past; right/up: future) while processing episodic (personal) memory or episodic 
future thinking (Hartmann et al., 2014).  
In this section, we have “ocularized” Talmy’s cognitive-semantic system perspective in relation 
to the subdomain event spacetime (a foundational part of the domain cognitive spacetime, which 
in turn belongs to the schematic system configurational structure). Empirical evidence 
(Hartmann et al., 2014; Stocker et al., in revision) has been given that Talmy’s “mental eyes,” 
which “look out” (2000a, p. 68) on a time line (cf. Talmy, 2000, pp. 73–76), actually perform 
this “looking out” via the physical eyes. The eyes move along a mental time line that is mentally 
projected into the peripersonal space right in front of us.  
 
4 Embodied attention  
A foundational property of the Talmyan schematic system attention is the concept of Figure and 
Ground.  
[There is a] pervasive system by which language establishes one concept as a reference point or anchor for another 
concept. It posits the existence in language of two fundamental cognitive functions, that of the Figure, performed 
by the concept that needs anchoring, and that of the Ground, performed by the concept that does the anchoring. The 
pair of concepts can be of two objects relating to each other in space...or the pair of concepts can be of two events 
relating to each other in a temporal, causal, or other type of situation (Talmy, 2000a, p. 311).  
Talmy (2000a; 2007a) offers an elaborate attention as well as an elaborate Figure-Ground 
analysis. In this article, I will only focus on some of the basic aspects of the highly elaborate 
attention system: on some “definitional characteristics” and on some “typically associated 
characteristics” (Talmy, 2000a, pp. 315–316; 2007a) of Figure and Ground. Thus, this is only a 
first example of how cognitive- semantic attention phenomena can relate to ocular phenomena. 
The definitional characteristics of Figure and Ground are mainly concerned with positional and 
relational information. Given the embodied account of the episodic mental time line in the 
previous section—that the physical eye places the episodic mental time line in the peripersonal 
space in front of us with the past to the left and the future to the right—it follows naturally, 
where Figure and Ground occur in this embodied (ocularized) account: on the mental time line 
that is ocularly projected into peripersonal space. In relation to (2), the temporal location of the 
subordinate clause (because she was tired) serves as the temporal Ground, in relation to which 
the temporal location of the main clause (Mary went to bed) is defined (the content of the main 
clause thus functions as a temporal Figure). Moreover, the use of the past tense in (8) also fuses 
Mary went to bed (Figure) and she was tired (Ground) into a Composite Figure that, as a whole, 
is temporally located to yet another Ground (Ground of Composite Figure) (cf. Stocker, 2012a, 
pp. 399–400; Talmy, 2000a, pp. 336–337). This second Ground is the present moment because 
the past tense virtually by definition implies that the present moment is used as an anchor or 
reference point in relation to which the point in the past is temporally referred to (Comrie, 1985; 
Stocker, 2012a, 2014a; Talmy, 2000a).  
One typical characteristic which is associated with Figure and Ground is that the “Figure is of 
greater relevance or concern than the Ground. The Figure is less immediately perceivable than 
the Ground but, once perceived, it is more salient, while the Ground is less salient once the 
Figure is perceived” (Talmy, 2007a, pp. XX; see also Talmy, 2000a, pp. 315–316). The greater 
relevance and salience of the Figure in relation to the Ground is also shown in the temporal 
(event-spatiotemporal) Figure and Ground along the ocular mental time line. For instance, in the 
already discussed study of Hartmann and colleagues (2014), participants looked to the left and 
downwards when retrieving an episodic memory image and to the right and upward when 
retrieving an episodic future image. Thus, the participants did not look at the temporal Ground 
(present moment), but at the temporal Figure (event in the past or future) while processing these 
memory images or future images (technically measured as mean eye gaze positions). This is just 
what one would expect if the Figure is of greater relevance and salience. These ocular findings 
then allow us to propose that the Figure and the Composite Figure in relation to (2) are more 
looked at by the physical eye (oculomotorically reflected attentional foregrounding) and that the 
Ground and the Ground of the Composite Figure are less (if it all) looked at by the physical eye 
(oculomotorically reflected attentional backgrounding).  
Fig. 3 illustrates the proposed Figure and Ground manifestation on the episodic mental time line 
in the peripersonal space in front of the body. The thus far examined mental structure in relation 
to (2)—the mental time line and associated Figure and Ground assignments—remains invisible 
to the cognizer. For instance, in our study which showed that our eyes look along the episodic 
mental time line (Hartmann et al., 2014), the 19 participants (with one exception) remained 
unaware that they were looking along a mental time line. While the participants in our “ocular 
episodic time line” study (Hartmann et al., 2014) remained generally unaware of the mental time 
line, they were able to report what sort of episodic memory or episodic future images they 
experienced while locating the events on the time line. Thus images appear in relation to 
specific points on the ocular mental time line—which is the topic of the next section.  
 
 Figure 3: Cognitive-semantic temporal Figure and Ground (from the schematic system 
attention) are proposed to attach themselves to particular geometric points (event locations) on 
the ocular mental time line in peripersonal space. The event in the subordinate clause because 
she was tired serves as a temporal Ground, in relation to which the temporal location of the 
event in the main clause Mary went to bed is defined (temporally defined as the subsequent 
event). Moreover, temporal Figure (Mary went to bed) and temporal Ground (because she was 
tired) fuse to a Composite Figure. The present moment serves as the Ground of the Composite 
Figure, in relation to which the whole Composite Figure is put before the present moment, i.e., 
is put into the past.  
In this section, we have added Talmy’s schematic category Figure and Ground (part of the 
schematic system attention) to the subdomain event spacetime. Event-spatiotemporal Figure and 
Ground attach themselves to geometric points (cf. Section 2) on the ocular mental time line. 
Thus, empirical evidence (Hartmann et al., 2014) supports the notion that temporal Figure and 
Ground arrangements are also mentally projected into the peripersonal space right in front of 
us—onto the time line that our eyes project into this peripersonal space.  
 
5 Embodied perspective in “space”  
While Section 2 added embodied perspective in “time” (event spacetime), in this section we will 
now add embodied perspective in “space” (object spacetime) to the conceptual structure 
underlying (2). 
At the mental-time-line location event B (cf. Figs. 1–4), the unfolding of a corresponding mental 
image i in the xyz-space of object spacetime could also take place while one is cognitively 
processing (2)—e.g., a mental image could emerge, in which the cognizer pictures Mary 
walking over to her bed, lying down on it. Similarly, the unfolding of a corresponding mental 
image i in the xyz-space of object spacetime could then also take place at mental-time-line 
location event A—e.g., i in which Mary is cognized as looking tired and as not being in bed yet. 
In terms of ocular mind theory, the proposal depicted in Fig. 4 is that the physical eyes serve a 
double function. On the one hand (in event spacetime), the eye gaze is directed at the (invisible) 
locations Event A and Event B on the mental time line. On the other hand, the eyes also look out 
at the mental images that unfold in relation to these time-line locations. That mental images are 
also “acted out” by corresponding eye movements, even when people are only imagining or 
recalling such scenes, is well known (e.g., Johansson, Holsanova & Holmqvist, 2006; Spivey & 
Geng, 2001). In Fig. 4, the possible unfolding of a mental image is graphically illustrated by 
“image bubbles” that unfold in relation to the given time- line locations. Note also in Fig. 4 that 
the imagistic content within the xyz-space of object spacetime is represented schematically as 
the pictorial elements ‘Mary’, ‘out of bed’, ‘tired’ (at Event A) and ‘Mary’, ‘goes to bed’ (at 
Event B). Furthermore, the pictorial-locational information within Event A ‘out of bed’ is not 
explicitly expressed linguistically in (2). However, there is reason to believe that this implicit 
semantic information is mentally represented. Note that logically speaking, Mary must be out of 
bed during Event A; if she were in bed from the beginning, she could not still go there. The 
reason for the decomposition of the mental image into these proposed pictorial elements in Fig. 
4 will become clear when, in the next section, we examine how force-dynamic elements attach 
themselves within a mental picture.  
Finally we turn to the t (time) of object spacetime. Fig. 4 represents a conglomerate structure of 
event spacetime (mental time line with ocularly indicated locations on it) and object spacetime 
(three-dimensional space with pictorial elements in it). In Fig. 4, the t of object spacetime (cf. 
Fig. 1a) is assumed to run along x of event spacetime (along the mental time line), just as the t of 
event spacetime does (cf. Fig 1b). Having one t unfolding along event-spatiotemporal x (rather 
than having two separate ts running within a single mental scene) seems a plausible and also the 
most parsimonious solution for t in mental representations that contain both object and event 
spacetime. The next section examines how configurational structure might manifest itself in 
relation to the pictorial elements in Fig. 4.  
 
Figure 4: Cognitive-semantic perspective in “space” is developed into an ocular perspective. 
The participants of the study of Hartmann et al. (2014) looked along such a diagonal mental 
time line (left/down for the past and right/up for the future) while at the same time creating a 
mental image of an episodic past or possible episodic future event. The eyes thus serve a double 
function—looking at the mental time line in peripersonal space and looking at the mental image. 
That mental images are also accompanied by corresponding eye movements during imagining or 
recalling such scenes is well known (e.g., Johansson et al., 2006; Spivey & Geng, 2001).  
In this section, we have “ocularized” Talmy’s cognitive-semantic system perspective in relation 
to the subdomain object spacetime. Empirical evidence (e.g., Johansson et al., 2006; Spivey & 
Geng, 2001) has been presented that has allowed us to interpret Talmy’s “mental eyes” that 
“look out” (2000a, p. 68) at a spatial scene (cf. Talmy, 2000, pp. 68–69) as the physical eyes 
that project mental content into the peripersonal space in front of our body. Thus, the eyes serve 
a double function in cases—like (2)—where both event spacetime and object spacetime are 
involved. The eyes look at a particular point (representing the location of an event) at the 
peripersonal mental time line and at the same time look out at the mental image that unfolds in 
relation to the time-line point.  
 
6 Some further aspects of embodied configurational structure in “space”  
We have already encountered the cognitive-semantic schematic system configurational 
structure in relation to the schematic categories domain and degree of extension in Section 2. In 
relation to domain, this has led to the introduction of the concept of cognitive spacetime with its 
two subdomains (domain member notions) object spacetime and event spacetime (Stocker, 
2014c). In relation to degree of extension, it was proposed that the events on the mental time 
line are points (no extension) (Stocker, 2012a; Talmy, 2000a, p. 61). In this section we now turn 
specifically to more object- spatiotemporal configurational structure that can be identified in 
relation to (2) (cf. (4-C-2) and (4-F-2a–b)).  
At its most general level, the Talmyan schematic system configurational structure involves  
. . . the schematic structuring or geometric delineations in space [object spacetime] or time [event spacetime] or 
other qualitative domain that closed-class forms can specify. Closed- class forms can ascribe such structure to the 
whole of a referent scene, thus partioning that scene into entities in particular relationships, or to any of those 
entities themselves, or to the paths described by such entities when their interrelationships change through time 
(Talmy, 2000a, p. 47).  
In (2)—Mary went to bed because she was tired—the open-class element Mary (from the open-
class category proper name) already encodes the notion person as well as the subnotions uniplex 
and female (see (3-A)). The closed-class element she (pronoun) encodes the discourse-temporal 
information person last mentioned (anaphoric function) (4-G-2). Additionally, she also encodes 
(as the proper name Mary does) the notions uniplex and female. The closed-class element to 
furthermore specifies that Mary is moving toward an object. Thus, to delineates a path (cf. 
Talmy, 2000b, pp. 25–27). In the mental representation underlying (2), the path in essence 
extends from a location out of bed (cf. also Section 7) to the location bed.  
Fig. 5 illustrates how the configurational elements uniplex and female are attached to the men- 
tally represented person Mary. During Event A (which is the second event, due to antisequential 
processing) the configurational element last person mentioned projects back in time to establish 
to which mentally represented person she refers to (it refers to Mary, as she is the last person 
mentioned and as she carries the values uniplex and female). The configurational elements 
uniplex and female are proposed to occur in relation to the mental representation of Mary, which 
unfolds within the xyz-space of object spacetime in the space in front of our body. In contrast, 
the configurational element last person mentioned does not project through object spacetime, 
but along the mental time line (event spacetime) in the space in front of our body, as this 
element projects from event to event—from the speech event when “she” is uttered (Event A) to 
the event when Mary is first mentioned (Event B).  
 
Figure 5: Cognitive-semantic configurational-structure elements in object spacetime (here, 
uniplex, female, and motion toward object) are proposed to structure mental images—here in 
relation to a mental image of Mary. Thus, configurational-structure elements attach to entities or 
their associated actions or states that occur within object spacetime. Additionally, the cognitive 
configurational- structure element last person mentioned—triggered off by the anaphoric 
component of she within Event A—projects along the mental time line of event spacetime to the 
moment when the referent is mentioned with a proper name (“Mary”) in Event B.  
In this section, we have added the member notions of the configurational-structure categories 
plexity (the notion uniplex), gender (the notion female), and path (the notion motion toward 
object) to entities or their associated states/actions within object spacetime. If cognizing these or 
other configurational structures are also reflected in the physical eye, has not been investigated 
yet. Section 8.2 discusses how complexity of configurational structure might be reflected in 
pupil size.  
Furthermore, it has been shown that anaphoric reference in relation to persons (as for instance 
encoded in she) involves projecting the information last person mentioned along the mental time 
line, back to the moment where the referent’s identity was established (for instance, by referring 
to a referent with a proper name such as Mary). If then the configurational object-spatiotemporal 
structure is identical between an entity and its anaphoric reference (Mary and she both 
configurationally encode uniplex and female), then the anaphoric reference can be successfully 
established. Given the theory of the ocular mind, all this configurational structure can be 
proposed to structure the conceptual content (Mary, goes, bed, tired) that unfolds in the 
spacetime in front of us. More precisely, one should perhaps no longer speak of “peripersonal 
space”, but of “peripersonal spacetime.” The embodied “home” of cognitive spacetime indeed 
seems, to a large extent, to be the space right in front of our body.  
7 Embodied force dynamics  
The Talmyan schematic system force dynamics involves  
. . . how entities interact with respect to force. Included here is the exertion of force, resistance to such a force, the 
overcoming of such a resistance, blockage of the expression of force, removal of such blockage, and the like 
(Talmy, 2000a, p. 409).  
The mental construction of cause and effect—the main concern of the current section—can also 
be systematically described in terms force dynamics. The force-dynamic system was first 
described by Talmy in 1985 (Talmy, 1985, 1988a, 2000a; see also Jackendoff, 1990, 1996; 
Pinker, 2007; Wolff, 2003, 2007). That there are force-dynamic patterns in our thinking has by 
now also been supported by experimental findings (Barbey & Wolff, 2007; Wolff, 2003, 2007; 
Wolff & Song, 2007). Stocker (2014b) has revised Talmy’s force dynamics to some degree. 
With this revision it is now—among other aspects—for instance possible to apply force 
dynamics to causation in general, irrespective of how concrete or abstract the causal relationship 
is. In Talmy’s account it was not always clear how force dynamics could be applied to certain 
abstract relationships such as cause-and-effect relationship between highly abstract ideational 
entities. This updated version of force dynamics is called elementary force dynamics (Stocker, 
2014b) because this theory also offers an account of the conceptual primitives (force-dynamic 
elements) that are involved in mentally representing cause and effect.  
Force dynamics, as proposed by Talmy (1985, 1988a, 2000a) and Stocker (2013; 2014b), 
involves the assumption that a mental representation of causality involves the mental 
representation of two conceptual entities that are in opposition and that are engaged in force 
interaction—for somewhat different views see Jackendoff (1996) and Wolff (2007). One of 
these two conceptual entities is called the agonist (Ago, different from the agonist in 
physiology). In Stocker’s (2014b) revised version of force dynamics—in elementary force 
dynamics (Stocker, 2014b)—Ago is a mental entity that can be attributed any state or action 
(called value x). The other of these two conceptual entities is called the antagonist (Ant, 
different from the antagonist in physiology). In elementary force dynamics, Ant is always 
conceptualized as wanting to impose a state or action onto Ago that is different from the initial 
action or state value that is associated with Ago (called value xdiff , where diff stands for 
“different”). The resultant (effect) of a force-dynamic interaction is always formulated in 
relation to Ago. This outcome depends on which force (Ago’s or Ant’s force) is conceptualized 
as being stronger. The force-dynamic value stronger is signified with (+) and weaker with (–). 
In conceptualizations that can be phrased with because (of)—as in (2)—Ant is always stronger. 
With the just described basics of elementary force dynamics, we are now in a position to add 
force dynamic structure to (2)—to Mary went to bed because she was tired—whose conceptual 
structure has thus far been analyzed in terms of configurational structure, attention, and 
perspective (Sections 2–5).  
In (2), Mary functions as Ago and Mary’s tiredness as Ant (see Stocker, 2014b for a detailed 
analysis). In elementary force dynamic terms, Ago Mary is in the initial locational state out of 
bed. This is counteracted by her tiredness, which functions as Ant carrying the value ‘indication 
to go to bed’ (in the sense that Mary’s tiredness suggests to Mary that it is indicated for her go to 
bed). In (2) Ant’s suggestive force (indication to go to bed) is stronger than Ago’s (Mary’s) 
locational state of being out of bed. Hence Mary is conceptualized as having gone to bed 
because this is what her tiredness suggested to her. Of course, there might have been many 
intermediate steps between the onset of Mary’s tiredness and her eventual going to bed. But (2) 
gaps all these intermediate steps, putting the attentional focus only on the initial tiredness and its 
end result of going to bed (cf. Talmy, 2000a, Chapter 4; 2007a).  
Stocker (2014b) uses a specific notational system to capture force-dynamic interactions (an ab- 
stracted version of Talmy’s original force-dynamic diagramming system). For a force-dynamic 
inter- action underlying our use of because—like (8)—the notational system looks as follows:  
(7) C: Ago-x(–), Ant-xdiff(+) → E: Ago-xdiff   
The elementary force-dynamic structure of the sentence “Mary went to bed because she was 
tired” was analyzed in (Stocker, 2014b, p. 132):   
(8) C: AgoMary-xout of bed(–), AntMary’s tiredness-xdiff indication to go to bed (+) → E: AgoMary-xdiff goes to 
bed  
The most natural descriptive solution to “add the [force-dynamic] forces that the elements of the 
[spatiotemporal] structural framework exert on each other” (Talmy, 2000a, p. 467) is to ascribe 
the corresponding force-dynamic elements to the mentally represented animate or inanimate 
entities (including abstract “entities” such as tiredness) and their associated actions/states that 
unfold within the xyz-space of object spacetime. The elements of the force-dynamic cause C 
manifest at the event- spatiotemporal Event A and the elements of the force-dynamic effect E at 
Event B. At A and B the xyzt-spacetime of object spacetime unfolds with a corresponding image 
within it (as described in Section 5). The force-dynamic elements attach to the mentally 
represented entities or to their associated action/states which unfold within this mental object 
spacetime. Thus, within the xyzt- spacetime unfolding at A (cause), the force-dynamic element 
Ago is attached to the mental (e.g., imagistic) representation of Mary; the force-dynamic 
element action/state x is attached to Mary’s mentally (e.g., imagistically) represented location of 
being out of bed; and the force-dynamic element Ant is attached to the conceptualization of 
Mary’s tiredness (her imagined physiological state). This conceptualized tiredness already 
projects into the future—to event B—that is, to the possibility that Mary’s tiredness could cause 
her to go to bed. This projection into the future is represented in Fig. 6 with an arrow going from 
xdiff at A to xdiff at B. It is the mental information goes to bed that attaches to the force-dynamic 
xdiff value. Then, within the xyzt-spacetime unfolding at B (effect), the force-dynamic element 
Ago is still attached to the mental representation of Mary, but as Ant has by now successfully 
imposed its xdiff force onto Ago, the force-dynamic element xdiff value goes to bed is now 
attached to Mary. Since by the time that the effect has taken place, the xdiff value is already 
realized, Mary is indeed cognized as having gone to bed because she was tired.  
Fig. 6 illustrates how the force-dynamic elements are attached to the mentally represented 
animate or inanimate entities (including abstract “entities” such as tiredness) and their 
associated actions/states that unfold within the xyz-space of object spacetime in the space in 
front of our body.  
 
 
Figure 6: Cognitive-semantic force-dynamic interactions are proposed to occur within the 
object-spatiotemporal mental images that appear at particular event-spatiotemporal locations. 
Force-dynamic elements can in principle attach to the same entities and/or their associated 
action/states as configurational elements attach themselves to (cf. Section 6). Thus Ago attaches 
to Mary and Ant to the abstract entity Mary’s tiredness. The indication of the force of the 
tiredness—its suggestion that it is time to go to bed—projects into the future (from event A to 
event B); thus it projects to the possibility that Mary’s tiredness could cause her to go to bed. As 
Ant’s force—indication to go to bed—is stronger than Mary’s state out of bed, Mary is indeed 
conceptualized as going to bed (at the time of event B).  
In this section, we have added force-dynamic elements to entities or their associated 
states/actions within the object-spatiotemporal mental images that appear in relation to 
particular points (event locations) on the mental time line. Moreover, as a final point worth 
stressing, we have seen that force-dynamic structure can also attach to content that is not 
explicitly expressed linguistically. For instance, Mary’s (Ago’s) initial x-value out of bed is not 
mentioned in (2)—in Mary went to bed because she was tired. This linguistically achieved 
gapping (Talmy, 2000a, Chapter 4; 2007a) is an indication that the image is more fully fleshed 
out than the linguistic expression thereof. Section 8.2 discusses how complexity of force 
dynamic structure might be reflected in pupil size.  
 
8 Discussion  
In this article, I introduced an embodied account of cognitive semantics—more specifically, a 
theory of ocular cognitive semantics. The theory basically proposes an “ocular mind”—that 
thought is spatialized and that our eyes project this spatialized thought into the external (usually 
near) space in front of our body. This spatialized, “looked upon thought” can, as I hope to have 
been able to show, very fruitfully be described with the schematic systems of cognitive 
semantics—with configurational structure, attention, perspective, and force dynamics (Talmy, 
2000a). Taking schizophrenia as a case in point, I will now discuss possible clinical implications 
of the theory of the ocular mind (or of ocular cognitive semantics) (Section 8.1). Then, finally, I 
will also discuss further empirical research which is needed for a more extended theory of 
embodied cognitive semantics (Section 8.2) before adding some concluding remarks.  
 
8.1 Clinical implications  
Discussing the implications of the theory of the ocular mind (of ocularized cognitive semantics), 
one could take the theory into many different realms. It could, I think, quite naturally be related 
to such areas as artificial intelligence, cognitive modeling, philosophy of mind, and computer 
science. Among the many options for which the implications of the theory of the ocular mind 
could be discussed, I chose a perhaps somewhat untypical one: clinical psychology. The choice 
might be untypical because it is, to my knowledge, not very common yet to relate findings from 
cognitive science—let alone cognitive linguistics or cognitive semantics—to clinical-
psychological fields such as psychiatry and psychotherapy. But why not? After all, much of 
cognitive science is devoted to gain an ever deeper understanding of the human mind. As 
clinical psychology reflects the phenomenon that many people have troubled minds, it seems 
quite natural to apply work which is devoted to trying to understand the mind to people that 
have trouble with it. I hope that one day in the not too distant future, the theory of the ocular 
mind can be used beneficially for such people. I will examine and discuss in what way this 
might be possible in relation to schizophrenia and ocular perspective in object spacetime. 
Schizophrenia is a severe mental disorder where people experience combinations of 
hallucinations, delusions, and disordered thinking and behavior.  
There are two basic ways how we can see a mental image that involves ourselves (for instance a 
memory image): we either see the mental scene as if we are looking out of our own eyes (called 
field perspective or embodied mental gaze, EMG), or we are looking at ourselves from an 
external perspective and thus also see ourselves in the memory image (called observer 
perspective or disembodied mental gaze, DMG) (e.g., Stocker, 2012b).  
It is not trivial through which of these perspectives we mentally see for instance a memory 
image. In a field memory perspective, one is known to retrieve richer accounts of affective 
reactions, physical sensations and psychological states, whereas in an observer memory 
perspective one is known to retrieve richer accounts of external (environmental) factors—
differences that are also reflected in corresponding brain activity (Eich et al., 2009). A classic 
finding is also that more distant memories are more likely to be recalled from an observer 
perspective and more recent memories are more likely to be recalled from a field perspective 
(Nigro & Neisser, 1983).  
Recently, the first study of field/observer perspective in patients with schizophrenia has shown 
that these patients recall their autobiographical memories significantly more often from an 
observer perspective when compared to healthy participants. Furthermore, patients with 
schizophrenia do not—unlike their healthy comparison participants—recollect more recent 
memories more from a field perspective (Potheegadoo et al., 2013). Potheegadoo and colleagues 
interpret the low frequency of field memory as reducing the likelihood that patients with 
schizophrenia regard themselves as the active agents of their own past: “The experiential sense 
of re-living personal events is thus diminished in patients with schizophrenia, giving rise to a 
passive and weakened sense of self” (p. 91).  
To the best of my knowledge, the question whether looking at a mental image from a field or 
observer perspective might be reflected systematically in ocular correlates has never been 
addressed yet. However, a study by Rice and Rubin (2011) has uncovered a phenomenon that 
might well be reflected oculomotorically: in most observer memories (in healthy individuals), 
the mental scene is seen from eye level (as if the scene were straight ahead of one’s eyes) or 
from above (as if one was looking down upon the scene). Eye-level or from-above observer 
memories make up about 80% of all observer memories and only about 20% of them are 
mentally seen from below (as if one was looking up upon the scene). The ocular mind theory—
the proposal that seeing mental images or sensing abstract spatial mental scaffoldings are 
reflected in corresponding eye movements—makes clear predictions how the external vantage 
point (straight ahead, above, below) of observer memories might be reflected oculomotorically. 
First, looking straight ahead (eye level) at a mental scene should lead to corresponding “straight-
ahead” (upward/downward-neutral) saccades; second, looking from above at a mental scene 
should lead to corresponding downward saccades; and finally, looking at a mental scene from 
below should lead to corresponding upward saccades. Accordingly, patients with schizophrenia 
might be more inclined to look straight ahead or downward with their eyes as they process their 
memories because they more often process their memories from an observer perspective 
(Potheegadoo et al., 2013). If future investigations were to find that patients with schizophrenia 
more often also oculomotorically look at their memories from eye level or from above (due to 
excessive use of the observer perspective), then a rehabilitation program, based on teaching 
patients with schizophrenia to relearn adopting a field perspective more often, could also be 
based on the ocular mind theory. Learning to retrieve their memories from a field perspective, 
these patients could for instance be encouraged to close their eyes (to minimize distracting 
visual input) while recollecting an autobiographical memory and to move their eyes as if they 
were in the midst of their memory and as if they were looking around at the mental scene from 
within their body. Such field-inducing exercises might eventually help to break through the 
observer-perspective fixation of these patients and help them to also see their memories from 
within their bodies again. As Potheegadoo and colleagues (2013) think, this might help these 
patients to regain the experience of a more active and stronger self. Fig. 7 illustrates the 
proposed observer-to-field intervention. These suggestions are of course speculations for a 
clinical application. While these ideas are based on empirical findings suggesting that mental 
perspective is reflected oculomotorically (e.g., Hartmann et al., 2014; Spivey & Geng, 2001; 
Stocker et al., in revision), they are first and foremost research questions that would require 
careful investigation prior to their application in a therapeutic setting.  
 
Figure 7: Ocular field and observer perspective and schizophrenia: a) According to the theory of 
the ocular mind, an observer perspective can be realized by using our eyes to project a mental 
image which includes oneself to the external (e.g., peripersonal) space in front of us. The 
observer mental image is symbolized by the picture frame. Note that the body with the eyes 
remains outside the mental picture; the location of the eyes represents this external vantage 
point. Oculomotorically, the theory of the ocular mind predicts that the observer perspective 
often involves looking straight ahead or downwards while retrieving the memory image, as 
observer memories are most often reported to be retrieved from these perspectives (Rice and 
Rubin, 2011). The study of Potheegadoo and colleagues (2013) suggests that patients with 
schizophrenia excessively externalize their self into such a body-exterior mental perspective as 
they recall their memories. b) According to the theory of the ocular mind, a field perspective can 
be realized by using our eyes to be in the midst of a mental image. Oculomotorically, the theory 
of the ocular mind predicts that the field perspective involves looking out of the eyes in any 
direction while processing the mental image, as the eyes are predicted to simply look at the 
scene in the same way as the scene was originally seen (which could also involve any direction). 
As described, patients with schizophrenia could during recall be taught to move their eyes as if 
they were in the midst of the memory (for instance with their eyes closed to minimize 
distracting visual input). Using the eyes in such a way might be helpful in inducing more 
frequent field perspective retrieval and thus in contributing to regaining a sense of a more active 
and a stronger self.  
Akin to field and observer perspective, Talmy has also described how perspective points can 
involve looking out at a mental scene from within a mentally represented body or from outside a 
mentally represented body (cf. also Stocker, 2012b):  
Consider ... the following bit of narrative: “She sat in the rocker near her bed and looked out the window. How 
lovely the sky was!” In the first sentence, the use of a third-person pronoun together with the objective scene 
description invites the listener to place his perspective point somewhere in the depicted room looking at the sitting 
woman. But in the second sentence, the exclamatory how-construction, together with the expression of subjective 
experience, induces the listener to relocate his perspective point to the location of the sitting woman, in effect, 
looking out through her eyes (Talmy, 2000a, pp. 68–69).  
As we can see in this quote, Talmy specifies which linguistic means are more likely to evoke an 
(observer-like) body-exterior perspective and which linguistic means are more likely to evoke a 
(field- like) body-interior perspective. It stands to reason that the linguistic means specified by 
Talmy (as well as further linguistic means) could be used as a complementary part in the 
treatment of patients with schizophrenia to induce more body-internal mental perspectives 
again. It also stands to reason that it would be useful to know how the physical eyes process 
such mental perspectives. This then is but one example how the worlds of embodied cognitive 
semantics and clinical psychology could meet.  
 
8.2 Further empirical research for embodied cognitive semantics  
In my view, the main question that ocular cognitive semantics faces is: does the gestural gaze 
which projects mental structure and content into peripersonal space merely play an 
epiphenomenal role or does it play a functional and facilitatory role in comprehending mental 
representations? There is at least one study which points to the possibility that the ocular time 
line might be functional in cognitively processing event spacetime. While it is well known that 
people with spatial neglect (with right-hemisphere lesions) neglect the left side of “space” 
(object spacetime), a new study has now also shown that these people additionally have 
difficulty with retrieving information in relation to past events (left side of mental time line), 
whereas they have no comparable difficulty with retrieving information in relation to future 
events (right side of mental time line) (Saj, Fuhrman, Vuilleumier, & Boroditsky, 2014). Further 
functional confirmation for the theory of the ocular mind could come from interference studies. 
For instance: if people (in Western culture) were to perform a future- related task and at the 
same time had to look upward and/or rightward (congruent future task), would this assist future 
processing (for instance, faster reaction times in a future/past categorization task)? In contrast, if 
people were to perform a past-related task and at the same time had to look downward and/or 
leftward, would this facilitate processing the past (congruent past task)? In contrast, if people 
had to look upward and/or rightward while retrieving a past memory, would this incongruence 
interfere with past processing—and if people had to look downward and/or leftward while 
imagining the future, would this incongruence interfere with future processing? If so, we would 
have some first strong evidence for a functional status of ocular cognitive semantics in the realm 
of perspective in event spacetime. Comparable experimental interference paradigms could also 
be thought of in relation to perspective in object spacetime.  
Experimental paradigms for the schematic systems configurational structure, attention, and force 
dynamics could be tested by cognitive effort paradigms. As we have seen, cognitive components 
like uniplex, female, motion toward object (configurational structure), Figure, Ground, 
Composite Figure, Ground of Composite Figure (attention), Ago, Ant, x, xdiff, etc. (force 
dynamics) can all attach to entities or their associated action/states in object spacetime (for 
instance in a mental image). It is also clear that not all concepts will have the same number of 
cognitive elements attached to them. For instance, the concepts cause and enable vary greatly in 
the number of force-dynamic elements attached to them (see Stocker, 2014b), with enable being 
force-dynamically much more complex than cause. In contrast, cause and despite share the 
exact same number of force-dynamic elements (it is just the force distribution that differs). 
Thus, processing concepts like cause and despite should involve less cognitive load than 
processing enable, as the latter involves processing more force-dynamic elements. 
Physiologically, greater cognitive load for instance shows in eliciting greater pupil dilation 
(Kahnemann & Beatty, 1966) or in eliciting greater EEG-measured negativity (Münte, Schiltz, 
Kutas, 1998). Thus, processing fewer cognitive semantic elements versus processing more 
cognitive semantic elements in object-spatiotemporal configurational structure, attention, and 
force dynamics might be reflected in comparable physiological cognitive-load correlates.  
 
Conclusion  
This article has been called “Toward an embodied cognitive semantics.” The concept toward is 
integrated because this article has exclusively dealt with the ocular aspect of embodied cognitive 
semantics. It has been shown how the schematic systems configurational structure, attention, 
perspective, and force dynamics can all be unified within an account of ocular cognitive 
semantics. However, a more comprehensive account of embodied cognitive semantics is likely 
to involve other embodied aspects than just the ocular one. Talmy (2015) for instance makes the 
case that force dynamics shares many cognitive-structural properties with somatosensory 
perception and motor control (pp. 25–27). In this newest article, Talmy fleshes out his 
“overlapping systems of cognitive organization” proposal quite comprehensively. His proposal 
is that different cognitive systems share structural properties to different degrees. Thus, he 
shows for example that the cognitive system language and the cognitive system visual 
perception have properties which they do not share (for instance the concept rotation features 
prominently in visual perception and only marginally in closed-class language), but also have 
some properties in common (for instance, possibly the way they structure space). Talmy stresses 
that  
this outline [overlapping systems model of cognitive organization] is heuristic—its proposals about intracognitive relationships 
are solely suggestive—but it affords a framework that empirical approaches can amend or refine. Since my expertise is in 
language, all suggestions about other cognitive systems await others’ expertise (Talmy, 2015, p. 2).  
The present investigation has added one empirical piece to Talmy’s model. It has been shown 
that the cognitive-semantic system perspective is not only structured by closed-class elements of 
language (Talmy, 2000a, 2015), but also by the physical eye that seems to project mental 
perspective right into the peripersonal space in front of our body.  
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